Chapter II, Section 3
In the previous Section the inconsistency of the doctrines of the various non-Vedantic schools has been shown. After showing the untenability and unreliability of other systems, Sri Vyasa, the author of Vedanta Sutras now proceeds to explain the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the Sruti system because there appear to be diversities of doctrines with reference to the origin of the elements, the senses, etc.
We now clearly understand that other philosophical doctrines are worthless on account of their mutual contradictions. Now a suspicion may arise that the Vedantic doctrine also is equally worthless on account of its intrinsic contradictions. Therefore a new discussion is begun in order to remove all doubts in the Vedanta passages which refer to creation and thus to remove the suspicion in the minds of the readers. Here we have to consider first the question whether ether (Akasa) has an origin or not.
In Sections III and IV the apparent contradictions in Sruti texts are beautifully harmonised and reconciled. The arguments of the opponent (Purvapakshin) who attempts to prove the Self-contradiction of the scriptural texts are given first. Then comes the refutation by the Siddhantin.
The Third Section of Chapter II deals with the order of creation as it is taught in Sruti, of the five primal elements namely Akasa, air, fire, water and earth. It discusses the question whether the elements have an origin or not, whether they are co-eternal with Brahman or issue from it and are withdrawn into it at stated intervals. The essential characteristics of the individual is also ascertained.
The first seven Adhikaranas deal with the five elementary substances.
Adhikarana I: (Sutras 1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman but originates from it as its first effect. Though there is no mention of Akasa in the Chhandogya Upanisad, the inclusion of Akasa is implied.
Adhikarana II: (Sutra 8) shows that air originates from ether.
Adhikarana III: (Sutra 9) teaches that there is no origin of that which is (i.e., Brahman) on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman, and as it does not stand to reason.
Adhikarana IV, V, VI: (Sutras, 10, 11, 12) teach that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.
Adhikarana VII: (Sutra 13) teaches that the origination of one element from another is due not to the latter in itself but to Brahman acting in it. Brahman who is their Indweller has actually evolved these successive elements.
Adhikarana VIII: (Sutra 14) shows that the absorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their creation.
Adhikarana IX: (Sutra 15) teaches that the order in which the creation and the re-absorption of the elements takes place is not interfered with by the creation and re-absorption of Prana, mind and the senses, because they also are the creations of Brahman, and are of elemental nature and therefore are created and absorbed together with the elements of which they consist.
The remaining portion of this Section is devoted to the special characteristics of the individual soul by comparing different Srutis bearing on this point.
Adhikarana X: (Sutra 16) shows that expressions such as Ramakrishna is born Ramakrishna has died, strictly apply to the body only and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.
Adhikarana XI: (Sutra 17) teaches that the individual soul is according to the Srutis permanent, eternal. Therefore it is not like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation. The Jiva is in reality identical with Brahman. What originates is merely the soul's connection with its limiting adjuncts such as mind, body, senses, etc. This connection is moreover illusory.
Adhikarana XII: (Sutra 18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that intelligence is the very essence of the soul.
Adhikarana XIII: (Sutras 19-32) deals with the question whether the individual soul is Anu, i.e., of very minute size or omnipresent, all-pervading. The Sutras 19-28 represent the view of the Purvapakshin according to which the individual soul is Anu, while Sutra 29 formulates the Siddhanta viz., the individual soul is in reality all-pervading; it is spoken of as Anu in some scriptural passages because the qualities of the internal organ itself are Anu which constitute the essence of the Jiva so long as he is involved in the Samsara.
Sutra 30 explains that the soul may be called Anu as it is connected with the Buddhi as long as it is implicated in the Samsara.
Sutra 31 intimates that in the state of deep sleep the soul is potentially connected with the Buddhi while in the waking state that connection becomes actually manifest.
Sutra 32 intimates that if no intellect existed there would result constant perception or constant non-perception.
Adhikaranas XIV and XV: (Sutras 33-39 and 40) refer to the Kartritva of the individual soul, whether the soul is an agent or not.
Sutras 33-39 declare that the soul is an agent. The soul is an agent when he is connected with the instruments of action, Buddhi, etc. Sutra 40 intimates that he ceases to be an agent when he is dissociated from them, just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments and rests after having laid them aside.
Adhikarana XVI: (Sutras 41-42) teaches that the agentship of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The Lord always directs the soul according to his good or bad actions done in previous births.
Adhikarana XVII (Sutras 43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman.
Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (Amsa) of Brahman. This Sutra propounds Avacchedavada i.e., the doctrine of limitation i.e., the doctrine that the soul is the Supreme Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.
The following Sutras intimate that the Supreme Lord is not affected by pleasure and pain like the individual soul, just as light is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections.
According to Sankara, `Amsa' must be understood to mean `Amsa iva', a part as it were. The one universal indivisible Brahman has no real parts but appears to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.
Sutra 47 teaches that the individual souls are required to follow the different injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the scriptures, when they are connected with bodies, high and low. Fire is one only but the fire of a funeral pyre is rejected and that of the sacrifice is accepted. Similar is the case with the Atman. When the soul is attached to the body, ethical rules, ideas of purity and impurity have full application.
Sutra 49 shows that there is no confusion of actions or faults of actions. The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone.
Sutra 50 propounds the doctrine of reflection (Abhasavada) or Pratibimbavada, the doctrine that the individual soul is a mere reflection of the Supreme Brahman in the Buddhi or intellect.
In the Sankhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of the Sankhyas is, therefore, an unfair conclusion.
VIYADADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 1 (SUTRAS 1-7)
ETHER IS NOT ETERNAL BUT CREATED
Na viyadasruteh II.3.1 (217)
(The Purvapakshin, i.e., the objector says that) ether (Akasa) (does) not (originate), as Sruti does not say so.
Na: not; Viyat: ether, space, Akasa; Asruteh: as Sruti does not say so.
The opponent raises a contention that Akasa is uncreated and as such not produced out of Brahman. This prima facie view is set aside in the next Sutra.
To begin with the texts which treat of creation are taken up. Akasa (ether) is first dealt with. The Purvapakshin says that Akasa is not caused or created because there is no Sruti to that effect. Akasa is eternal and is not caused because the Sruti does not call it caused, while it refers to the creation of fire. Tadaikshata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo'srijata It thought `May I become many, may I grow forth'It sent forth fire. (Chh. Up. VI.2.3). Here there is no mention of Akasa being produced by Brahman. As scriptural sentence is our only authority in the origination of knowledge of supersensuous things, and as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of ether, ether must be considered to have no origin. Therefore Akasa has no origin. It is eternal.
In the Vedantic texts, we come across in different places different statements regarding the origin of various things. Some texts say that the ether and air originated; some do not. Some other texts again make similar statements regarding the individual soul and the Pranas (vital airs). In some places the Sruti texts contradict one another regarding order of succession and the like.
Asti tu II.3.2 (218)
But there is (a Sruti text which states that Akasa is created).
Asti: there is; Tu: but.
The contradiction raised in Sutra 1 is partially met here.
The word `but' (tu) is used in this Sutra in order to remove the doubt raised in the preceding Sutra.
But there is a Sruti which expressly says so. Though there is no statement in the Chhandogya Upanishad regarding the causation of Akasa, yet there is a passage in the Taittiriya Sruti on its causation. Tasmad va etasmadatmana akasah sambhutah From the Self (Brahman) sprang Akasa, from Akasa the air, from air the fire, from fire the water, from water the earth (Tait. Up. II.1).
Gaunyasambhavat II.3.3 (219)
(The Sruti text concerning the origination of Akasa) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of the Akasa).
Gauni: used in a secondary sense, having a metaphorical sense; Asambhavat: because of the impossibility.
Here is an objection against Sutra 20.
The opponent says: The Taittiriya text referred to in the previous Sutra which declares the origination of the Akasa should be taken in a secondary sense (figurative), as Akasa cannot be created. It has no parts. Therefore it cannot be created.
The Vaiseshikas deny that Akasa was caused. They say that causation implies three factors, viz., Samavayikarana (inherent causesmany and similar factors), Asamavayikarana (non- inherent causes, their combination) and Nimittakarana (operative causes, a human agency). To make a cloth threads and their combination and a weaver are needed. Such causal factors do not exist in the case of Akasa.
We cannot predicate of space a spaceless state, just as we can predicate of fire an antecedent state without brightness.
Further unlike earth, etc., Akasa is all-pervading and hence could not have been caused or created. It is eternal. It is without origin.
The word `Akasa' is used in a secondary sense in such phrases as `make room', `there is room'. Although space is only one it is designated as being of different kinds when we speak of the space of a pot, the space of a house. Even in Vedic passages a form of expression such as `He is to place the wild animals in the spaces (Akaseshu)' is seen. Hence we conclude that those Sruti texts also which speak of the origination of Akasa must be taken to have a secondary sense or figurative meaning.
Sabdacca II.3.4 (220)
Also from the Sruti texts (we find that Akasa is eternal).
Sabdat: from the Sruti texts, because Sruti says so; Cha: also, and.
Here is an objection against Sutra 2.
In the previous Sutra Akasa was inferred to be eternal. In this Sutra the opponent cites a Sruti text to show that it is eternal. He points out that Sruti describes Akasa as uncaused and uncreated. Vayuschantariksham chaitadamritamThe air and the Akasa are immortal (Br Up. II.3.3). What is immortal cannot have an origin.
Another scriptural passage, Omnipresent and eternal like etherAkasavat sarvagato nityah, indicates that those two qualities of Brahman belong to the ether also. Hence an origin cannot be attributed to the Akasa.
Other scriptural passages are: As this Akasa is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite. Brahman has the ether for its body, the Akasa is the Self. If the Akasa had a beginning it could not be predicated of Brahman as we predicate blueness of a lotus (lotus is blue).
Therefore the eternal Brahman is of the same nature as Akasa. (This is the view of the opponentPurvapakshin).
Syaccaikasya Brahmasabdavat II.3.5 (221)
It is possible that the one word (`sprang'Sambhutah) may be used in a secondary and primary sense like the word Brahman.
Syat: is possible; Cha: also, and; Ekasya: of the one and the same word; Brahmasabdavat: like the word Brahman.
An argument in support of the above objection is now advanced by the opponent (Purvapakshin).
The opponent says that the same word `sprang' (Sambhutah) in the Taittiriya text (II.1)From that Brahman sprang Akasa, from Akasa sprang air, from air sprang fire.can be used in a secondary sense with respect to Akasa and in the primary sense with respect to air, fire, etc. He supports his statement by making reference to other Sruti texts where the word `Brahman' is so used. Try to know Brahman by penance, because, penance is Brahman (Tait. Up. III.2). Here Brahman is used both in a primary and in a secondary sense in the same text.
The same word Brahman is in the way of figurative identification (Bhakti) applied to penance which is only the means of knowing Brahman and again directly to Brahman as the object of knowledge.
Also Food is BrahmanAnnam Brahma (Tait. Up. III.2), and Bliss is BrahmanAnando Brahma (Tait. Up. III.6). Here Brahman is used in a secondary and primary sense respectively in two complementary texts.
The Vedantin says: But how can we uphold now the validity of the statement made in the clause, Brahman is one only without a secondEkameva Advitiyam Brahma. Because if Akasa is a second entity co-existing with Brahman from eternity, it follows that Brahman has a second. If it is so, how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything is known? (Chh. Up. VI.1.3).
The opponent replies that the words Ekamevaone only are used with reference to the effects. Just as when a man sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel and so on today and on the following day a number of pots and says that clay alone existed on the previous day, he means only that the effects, i.e., the pots did not exist and does not deny the wheel or the stick of the potter, even so the passage means only that there is no other cause for Brahman which is the material cause of the world. The term `without a second' does not exclude the existence from eternity of ether but excludes the existence of any other superintending Being but Brahman. There is a superintending potter in addition to the material cause of the vessels, i.e., the clay. But there is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the material cause of the universe.
The opponent further adds that the existence of Akasa will not bring about the existence of two things, for number comes in only when there are diverse things. Brahman and Akasa have no such diverseness before creation as both are all-pervading and infinite and are indistinguishable like milk and water mixed together. Therefore the Sruti says: Akasasariram BrahmaBrahman has the ether for its body. It follows that the two are identical.
Moreover all created things are one with Akasa which is one with Brahman. Therefore if Brahman is known with its effects, Akasa also is known.
The case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured into a cup of milk. These drops are taken when the milk is taken. The taking of the drops does not form something additional to the taking of the milk. Similarly the Akasa which is non-separate in place and time from Brahman, and its effects, is comprised within Brahman. Therefore, we have to understand the passages about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.
Thus the opponent (Purvapakshin) tries to establish that Akasa is uncreated and is not an effect and that the Sruti text calls it `Sambhuta' (created) only in a secondary sense.
Pratijna'haniravyatirekacchabdebhyah II.3.6 (222)
The non-abandonment of the proposition (viz., by the knowledge of one everything else becomes known, can result only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from Brahman) according to the words of the Veda or the Sruti texts (which declare the non-difference of the cause and its effects).
Pratijna ahanih: non-abandonment of the proposition; Avyatirekat: from non distinction, on account of non-difference, because of absence of exclusion; Sabdebhyah: from the words namely from the Srutis.
The objection raised in Sutra 1 and continued in Sutras 3, 4 and 5 is now replied to.
The Sutrakara refutes the Purvapakshin's (objector's) view and establishes his position. The scriptural assertion that from the knowledge of One (Brahman) everything else is known can be true only if everything in the world is an effect of Brahman. Because the Sruti says that the effects are not different from the cause. Therefore if the cause (Brahman) is known, the effects also will be known. If Akasa does not originate from Brahman, then by knowing Brahman we cannot know Akasa. Therefore the above assertion will not come true. Akasa still remains to be known as it is not an effect of Brahman. But if Akasa is created then there will be no such difficulty at all. Therefore Akasa is an effect. It is created. If it is not created the authoritativeness of the Vedas will disappear.
The opponent is entirely wrong in imagining that the Taittiriya Sruti is in conflict with Chhandogya Upanishad. You will have to add in the Chhandogya Sruti After creating Akasa and Vayu. Then the text would mean that after creating Akasa and Vayu Brahman created fire. Now there will be no conflict at all.
Moreover, the explanation that as Brahman and Akasa are one like milk and water and that as Akasa is one with all things it will be known by knowing Brahman and its effects is entirely wrong, because the knowledge of milk and water which are one is not a correct knowledge. The analogy given in the Sruti text is not milk and water, but clay and jars to indicate that all effects are not separate from the cause and because the word `eva' in Ekameva Advitiyam excludes two combined things like milk and water and says that only one entity is the cause.
The knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing of which the Sruti speaks cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, for we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward, (Chh. Up. VI.1.4), that the knowledge of everything has to be experienced through the relation of the material cause and the material effect. The knowledge of the cause implies the knowledge of the effect. Further, the knowledge of everything, if taken to be similar to the case of knowledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (Samyag-Vijnana), because the water which is apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk with which it is mixed is not grasped by perfect knowledge, because the water although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.
That nothing has an independent existence apart from Brahman is corroborated by statements in Sruti: Sarvam khalvidam BrahmaIdam sarvam yadayamatma. That Self is all that is (Bri. Up. II.4.6).
Yavadvikaram tu vibhago lokavat II.3.7 (223)
But wherever there are effects, there are separateness as is seen in the world (as in ordinary life).
Yavat vikaram: so far as all modifications go, wherever there is an effect; Tu: but; Vibhagah: division, separateness, distinction, specification; Lokavat: as in the world. (Yavat: whatever; Vikaram: transformation.)
The argument begun in Sutra 6 is concluded here.
The word `tu' (but) refutes the idea that Akasa is not created. It shows that the doubt raised in the last Sutra is being removed.
The Chhandogya Upanishad purposely omits Akasa and Vayu from the list enumerated, because it keeps in view the process of Trivritkarana, combination of the three visible elements (Murta, i.e., with form), instead of Panchikarana, combination of five elements which is elsewhere developed.
It is to be noted here that though all the elements originate from Brahman, yet Akasa and air are not mentioned by name in the Sruti, Chhandogya Upanishad, whereas fire, water and earth are distinctly stated therein to have originated from Brahman. The specification is like that found in similar cases of ordinary experience in the world, for instance, to mean all the sons of a particular person, Ramakrishna, only a few of them are named.
This is just like what we find in the ordinary world. If a man says all these are sons of Narayana and then he gives certain particulars about the birth of one of them, he implies thereby that it applies to the birth of all the rest. Even so when the Upanishad says that all this has its self in Brahman and then it goes on to give the origin of some of them from Brahman such as fire, water and earth, it does not mean that others have not their origin in Him, but it only means that it was not thought necessary to give a detailed account of their origin. Therefore, though there is no express text in the Chhandogya Upanishad as to the origin of Akasa, yet we infer from the universal proposition therein that everything has its self in Brahman, that Akasa has its self in Brahman, and so is produced from Brahman.
Akasa is an element like fire and air. Therefore it must have an origin. It is the substratum of impermanent quality like the sound, and so it must be impermanent. This is the direct argument to prove the origin and destruction of Akasa. The indirect argument to prove it is, whatever has no origin is eternal as Brahman and whatever has permanent qualities is eternal as the soul, but Akasa not being like Brahman in these respects, cannot be eternal.
Akasa takes its origin from Brahman, though we cannot conceive how space can have any origin.
We see in this universe that all created things are different from each other. Whatever we observe: effects or modifications of a substance such as jars, pots, bracelets, armlets, and ear-rings, needles, arrows, and swords we observe division or separateness. Whatever is divided or separate is an effect, as jars, pots, etc. Whatever is not an effect is not divided as the Atman or Brahman. A pot is different from a piece of cloth and so on. Everything that is divided or separate is created. It cannot be eternal. You cannot think of a thing as separate from others and yet eternal.
Akasa is separate from earth, etc. Hence Akasa also must be an effect. It cannot be eternal. It must be a created thing.
If you say that Atman also, being apparently separate from Akasa etc., must be an effect we reply that it is not so, because Akasa itself has originated from Atman. The Sruti declares that Akasa sprang from the Atman (Tait. Up. II.1). If Atman also is an effect, Akasa etc., will be without an Atman i.e., Svarupa. The result will be Sunyavada or the doctrine of nothingness. Atman is Being, therefore it cannot be negatived. Atmatvacchatmano nirakaranasankanupapattih. It is self-existent. Na hyatma- gantukah kasyachit, svayam siddhatvat. It is self-evident. Na hyatma atmanah pramanapekshaya siddhyati.
Akasa etc., are not stated by any one to be self-existent. Hence no one can deny the Atman, because the denier is himself, Atman. Atman exists and is eternal.
The All-pervasiveness and eternity of Akasa are only relatively true. Akasa is created. It is an effect of Brahman.
In the clauses, I know at the present moment whatever is present, I knew at former moments, the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know in the future, the nearer and remoter future the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present. But the knowing agent does not change at all as his nature is eternal presence. As the nature of the Atman is eternal presence it cannot be annihilated even when the body is burnt to ashes. You cannot even think that it ever should become something different from what it is. Hence the Atman or Brahman is not an effect. The Akasa, on the contrary, comes under the category of effects.
Moreover, you say that there must be many and similar causal factors before an effect can be produced. This argument is not correct. Threads are Dravya (substance). Their combination (Samyoga) is a Guna (attribute) and yet both are factors in the production of an effect. Even if you say that the need for many and similar causal factors applies only to Samavayikarana, this sort of explanation is not correct, for a rope or a carpet is spun out of thread, wool, etc.
Moreover, why do you say that many causal factors are needed? In the case of Paramanu or ultimate atom or mind, the initial activity is admittedly not due to many causal factors. Nor can you say that only for a Dravya (substance) many causal factors are necessary. That would be so, if combination causes the effect as in the case of threads and cloth. But in many instances, (e.g., milk becomes curd) the same substance changes into another substance. It is not the Lord's law that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide on the authority of the Sruti that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, Akasa being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession (Vide II.1.24).
It is not right to say that with reference to the origin of Akasa we could not find out any difference between its pre-causal state and its post-causal state (the time before and after the origination of ether). Brahman is described as not gross and not subtle (Asthulam na anu) in the Sruti. The Sruti refers to an Anakasa state, a state devoid of Akasa.
Brahman does not participate in the nature of Akasa as we understand from the passage. It is without Akasa (Bri. Up. III.8.8). Therefore it is a settled conclusion that, before Akasa was produced, Brahman existed without Akasa.
Moreover, you (Purvapakshin or opponent) are certainly wrong in saying that Akasa is different in its nature from earth, etc. The Sruti is against the uncreatedness of Akasa. Hence there is no good in such inference.
The inference drawn by you that Akasa has no beginning because it differs in nature from these substances which have a beginning such as earth, etc., is without any value, because it must be considered fallacious as it is contradicted by the Sruti. We have brought forward cogent, convincing and strong arguments showing that Akasa is an originated thing.
Akasa has Anitya-guna (non-eternal attribute). Therefore it also is Anitya (non-eternal). Akasa is non-eternal because it is the substratum of a non-eternal quality, viz., sound, just as jars and other things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities are themselves non-eternal. The Vedantin who takes his stand on the Upanishads does not admit that the Atman is the substratum of non-eternal qualities.
You cannot say that Atman also may be Anitya (non-eternal) for Sruti declares that Atman is eternal (Nitya).
The Sruti texts which describe Akasa as eternal (Amrita) describe it so in a secondary sense only (Gauna), just as it calls heaven-dwelling gods as eternal (Amrita). The origin and destruction of Akasa has been shown to be possible.
Even in the Sruti text, Akasavat sarvagatacha nityah which describes Atman as similar to Akasa in being all-pervading and eternal, these words are used only in a secondary and figurative sense (Gauna).
The words are used only to indicate infiniteness or super-eminent greatness of Atman and not to say that Atman and Akasa are equal. The use is as when the sun is said to go like an arrow. When we say that the sun moves with the speed of an arrow, we simply mean that he moves fast, not that he moves at the same rate as an arrow.
Such passages as Brahman is greater or vaster than Akasa prove that the extent of Akasa is less than that of Brahman. Passages like There is no image of Him. There is nothing like BrahmanNa tasya pratimasti (Svet. Up. IV.19) show that there is nothing to compare Brahman to. Passages like Everything else is of evil (Bri. Up. III.4.2) show that everything different from Brahman such as Akasa is of evil. All but Brahman is small. Hence Akasa is an effect of Brahman.
Srutis and reasoning show that Akasa has an origin. Therefore the final settled conclusion is that Akasa is an effect of Brahman.
MATARISVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 2
AIR ORIGINATES FROM ETHER
Etena matarisva vyakhyatah II.3.8 (224)
By this i.e., the foregoing explanation about Akasa being a product, (the fact of) air (also being an effect) is explained.
Etena: by this, i.e., the foregoing explanation about Akasa being a production, by this parity of reasoning; Matarisva: the air, the mover in mother, space; Vyakhyatah: is explained.
This Sutra states that air also, like Akasa, has been created by and from Brahman.
The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning Akasa to the air of which the Akasa is the abode. The Purvapakshin maintains that the air is not a product, because it is not mentioned in the chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad which treats of the origination of things. The Purvapakshin says that the birth of air mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad is figurative only, because air is said to be one of the immortal along with Akasa.
Vayu (the air) is the deity that never sets (Bri. Up. I.5.22). The denial of Vayu's never setting refers to the lower knowledge or Apara Vidya in which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under the form of Vayu and is merely a relative one.
The glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of worship. The Sruti says Vayu never sets. Some dull type of men may think that Vayu (air) is eternal. To remove this doubt there is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to air also.
Vayu is called deathless or immortal only in a figurative sense. Vayu (air) also has origin like Akasa.
ASAMBHAVADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 3
BRAHMAN (SAT) HAS NO ORIGIN
Asambhavstu sato'nupapatteh II.3.9 (225)
But there is no origin of that which is (i.e., Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).
Asambhavah: no origination, no creation; Tu: but; Satah: of the Sat, of the true one, eternally existing, of Brahman; Anupapatteh: as it does not stand to reason, on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman.
This Sutra states that Brahman has no origin as it is, neither proved by reasoning nor directly stated by Sruti.
The word `tu' (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.
The opponent says that Svetasvatara Upanishad declares that Brahman is born, Thou art born with Thy face turned to all directions (Svet. Up. 4.3).
We cannot, as in the case of Akasa and Vayu, attribute origin to Brahman also. Brahman is not an effect like Akasa, etc. Origination of Brahman cannot be established by any method of proof.
Brahman is existence itself. It cannot be an effect, as It can have no cause. The Sruti text expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor. He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the organs and there is of Him neither progenitor nor Lord (Svet. Up. VI.9).
Moreover it is not separated from anything else.
Neither can Sat come from Asat, as Asat has no being, for that which is not (Asat) is without a self and cannot therefore constitute a cause, because a cause is the self of its effects. The Sruti says How can existence come out of non-existence? (Chh. Up. VI.2.2).
You cannot say that Sat comes from Sat as the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority on the part of the cause. The effect must have some speciality not possessed by the cause. Brahman is mere existence without any destruction.
Brahman cannot spring from that which is something particular, as this would be contrary to experience. Because we observe that particular forms are produced from what is general, as for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that which is general is produced from particulars. Hence Brahman which is existence in general, cannot be the effect of any particular thing.
If there is no eternal First Cause, the logical fallacy of Anavastha Dosha (regressus ad infinitum) is inevitable. The non-admission of a fundamental cause (substance) would drive us to a retrogressus ad infinitum. Sruti says, That great birthless Self is undecaying (Bri. Up. IV.4.25).
Brahman is without any origin. According to Sruti, He alone is the True one, who exists eternally. On the supposition of the origin of Brahman, He cannot be said to be eternal. Hence such a supposition is against Sruti. It is also against reasoning, because by admitting such an origin the question of source of that origin arises; then again another source of that source and so on. Thus an argument may be continued ad infinitum without coming to a definite conclusion.
That fundamental causesubstancewhich is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our Brahman.
Therefore Brahman is not an effect but is eternal.
TEJO'DHIKARANAM: TOPIC 4
FIRE ORIGINATES FROM AIR
Tejo'tah tatha hyaha II.3.10 (226)
Fire (is produced) from this (i.e., air), so verily (declares the Sruti).
Tejah: fire; Atah: from this, namely from air which has been just spoken of in Sutra 8; Tatha: thus, so; Hi: because, verily; Aha: says (Sruti).
Taittiriya Upanishad declares that fire was born of air VayoragnihFrom air is produced fire (Tait. Up. II.1). Chhandogya Upanishad declares That (Brahman) created fire (Chh. Up. IV.2.3).
The consistency of the two Srutis is shown in Sutra 13.
There is thus a conflict of scriptural passages with regard to the origin of fire. The Purvapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source. Why? Because the text declares in the beginning that there existed only that which is. It sent forth fire. The assertion that everything can be known through Brahman is possible only if everything is produced from Brahman. The scriptural statement Tajjalan (Chh. Up. III.14.1) specifies no difference. The Mundaka text (II.1.3) declares that everything without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriya Upanishad speaks about the entire universe without any exception After having brooded, sent forth all whatever there is (Tait. Up. II.6). Therefore, the statement that `Fire was produced from air' (Tait. Up. II.1) teaches the order of succession only. Fire was produced subsequently to air.
The Purvapakshin says: The above two Upanishadic passages can be reconciled by interpreting the Taittiriya text to mean the order of sequenceBrahman after creating air, created fire.
This Sutra refutes this and says that Fire is produced from Vayu or air. This does not at all contradict the Chhandogya text. It means that Air is a product of Brahman and that fire is produced from Brahman, which has assumed the form of air. Fire sprang from Brahman only through intermediate links, not directly. We may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.
The general assertion that everything springs from Brahman requires that all things should ultimately be traced to that cause, and not that they should be its immediate effects. Thus there is no contradiction. There remains no difficulty.
It is not right to say that Brahman directly created Fire after creating Air, because the Taittiriya expressly says that fire was born of Air. No doubt Brahman is the root cause.
ABADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 5
WATER IS PRODUCED FROM FIRE
Apah lI.3.11 (227)
Water (is produced from fire).
(Atah: from it; Tatha: thus; Hi: because; Aha: says the Sruti.)
The same thing may be said of water.
We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words thence and for thus the text declares.
The author of the Sutras explained the creation of fire in the previous Sutra. He explains creation of earth in the next Sutra. He propounds the Sutra in order to insert water and thus to point out its position in the Srishtikrama or order of creation.
AgnerapahFrom fire sprang water (Tait. Up. II.1). Tatteja aiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tadapo'srijataThe fire thought `May I be many, may I grow forth.' It created water. (Chh. Up. VI.2.3).
Doubt: Does water come out directly from fire or from Brahman?
The Purvapakshin says: Water comes out directly from Brahman as the Chhandyoga text teaches.
Siddhanta: There is no such conflict. From fire is produced water, for thus says the scripture.
Here also it means that as fire is a product of Brahman, it is from Brahman which has assumed the form of fire, that water is produced. There is no room for interpretation regarding a text which is express and unambiguous.
In the Chhandogya Upanishad is given the reason why water comes out of fire. And, therefore, whenever anybody anywhere is hot and perspires water is produced on him from fire alone. Similarly, when a man suffers grief and is hot with sorrow, he weeps and thus water is also produced from fire.
These explicit statements leave no doubt that water is created from fire.
PRITHIVYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 6
EARTH IS CREATED FROM WATER
Prithivi adhikararupasabdantarebhya II.3.12 (228)
The earth (is meant by the word `Anna') because of the subject matter, colour and other Sruti texts.
Prithivi: earth; Adhikara: because of the context, because of the subject matter; Rupa: colour; Sabdantarebhyah: on account of other texts (Sruti).
The same thing may be said of earth.
From water sprang earth (Tait. Up. II.1). It (water) produced Anna (literally food) (Chh. Up. VI.2.4). The two Sruti texts are apparently contradictory, because in one text water is said to produce earth and in another food.
The Sutra says that `Anna' in the Chhandogya text means not food but earth. Why? On account of the subject matter, on account of the colour, and on account of other passages. The subject matter in the first place is clearly connected with the elements, as we see from the preceding passages. It sent forth fire; it sent forth water. In describing the creative order we cannot jump from water to cereals without having the earth. The creative order referred to is in regard to the elements. Therefore `Anna' should refer to an element and not food.
Again we find in a complementary passage, The black colour in fire is the colour of Anna (Chh. Up. VI.4.1). Here, the reference to colour expressly indicates that the earth is meant by `Anna'. Black colour agrees with earth. The predominant colour of earth is black. Eatable things such as cooked dishes, rice, barley and the like are not necessarily black. The Pauranikas also designate the colour of the earth by the term `night'. The night is black. We, therefore, conclude that black is the colour of earth, also.
Other Sruti texts like What was there as the froth of the water, that was hardened and became the earth. (Bri. Up I.2.2), clearly indicate that from water earth is produced.
On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like were produced from the earth, From earth sprang herbs, from herbs food (Tait. Up. II.1.2).
The complementary passage also, whenever it rains etc., pointing out that owing to the earthly nature of food (rice, barley, etc.), earth itself immediately springs from water.
Therefore, for all these reasons the word `Anna' denotes this earth. There is really no contradiction between the Chhandogya and Taittiriya texts.
TADABHIDHYANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 7
BRAHMAN ABIDING WITHIN THE ELEMENT IS THE CREATIVE PRINCIPLE
Tadabhidhyanadeva tu tallingat sah II.3.13 (229)
But on account of the indicating mark supplied by their reflecting, i.e., by the reflection attributed to the elements, He (i.e., the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).
Tat (Tasya): His (of Brahman); Abhidhynat: because of the volition, reflection; Eva: even, only; Tu: but; Tat lingat: because of His indicating marks; Sah: He.
The contention raised in Sutra 10 is now refuted.
The word `tu' (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.
The Purvapakshin or the objector says: The Srutis declare that Brahman is the creator of everything. But the Taittiriya Upanishad says From Akasa sprang air (Tait. Up. II.1). This indicates that certain elements produce certain effects independently. There is contradiction in the Sruti passages. This Sutra refutes this objection.
Creation of Akasa, fire, wind, water is done solely to God's will. One element cannot create another element out of its own power. It is God in the form of one element that creates another element therefrom by His will.
The elements are inert. They have no power to create. Brahman Himself acting from within the elements was the real creator of all those elements. You will find in Brihadaranyka Upanishad He who dwells within the fire, who is different from fire, whom fire does not know, whose body is fire, who rules the fire from within, is Thy Immortal Atman, the Inner Ruler within (Bri. Up. III.7.5).
This Sruti text indicates that the Supreme Lord is the sole Ruler and denies all independence to the elements.
Though it is stated in the Chhandogya Upanishad that the elements have created each one, the other next of it, yet the Supreme Lord is indeed the creator of everything because Sruti declares that Brahman has created this world by the exercise of His will.
Texts such as He wished may I become many, may I grow forth (Tait. Up. II.6) and It made itself its Self, i.e., the Self of everything which exists (II.7)indicates that the Supreme Lord is the Self of everything. The passage There is no other seer (thinker) but He denies there being any other seer (thinker), that which is (i.e., Brahman) in the character of seer or thinker constitutes the subject matter of the whole Chapter, as we conclude from the introductory passage It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth (Chh. Up. VI.2.3).
In the Chhandogya Upanishad it is stated That fire thought. That water thought. Reflection is not possible for the inert elements. The Supreme Lord, the Inner Ruler of all elements, the Indweller within the elements reflected and produced the effects. This is the real meaning. The elements became causes only through the agency of the Supreme Lord who abides within them and rules them from within. Therefore there is no contradiction at all between the two texts.
For a wise man who reflects and cogitates there is no contradiction. The Sruti texts are infallible and authoritative. Remember this point well always. The Sruti texts have come out from the hearts of realised sages who had direct intuitive experience in Nirvikalpa Samadhi. They are neither fictitious novels nor products of the intellect.
VIPARYAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 8
THE PROCESS OF DISSOLUTION OF THE ELEMENTS IS
in the reverse order from that of creation
Viparyayena tu kramo'tah upapadyate cha II.3.14 (230)
The order (in which the elements are indeed withdrawn into Brahman during Pralaya or dissolution) is the reverse of that (i.e., the order in which they are created) and this is reasonable.
Viparyayena: in the reverse order; Tu: indeed, but; Kramah: order, the process of dissolution; Atah: from that (the order of creation); Cha: and; Upapadyate: is reasonable.
The process of dissolution of the element is described in this Sutra.
The word `tu' (but) has the force of `only' here. The question here is whether at the time of cosmic dissolution or Pralaya the elements are withdrawn into Brahman in an indefinite order, or in the order of creation or in the reverse order.
In creation the order is from above and in dissolution the order is from below. The order of involution is in the inverse of the order of evolution. It alone is quite appropriate and reasonable. Because we see in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has in descending to take the steps in the reverse order.
Further, we observe that things made of clay such as jars, dishes, etc., on being destroyed pass back into clay and that things which have originated from water such as snow and hail-stones again dissolve into water, the cause.
The gross becomes resolved into the subtle, the subtle into the subtler and so on till the whole manifestation attains its final First Cause, viz., Brahman. Each element is withdrawn into its immediate cause, in the reverse order till Akasa is reached, which in turn gets merged in Brahman.
Smriti also declares O Divine Rishi; the earth, the basis of the universe is dissolved into water, water into fire, fire into air.
Those which are produced first in creation are more powerful. Consequently they have longer existence. Therefore, it follows logically that the latest in creation, being of feeble essence, should first become absorbed in those of higher powers. The higher powers should later on take their turn. Vamana Purana declares: The earlier a thing happens to be in creation, the more it becomes the receptacle of the Lord's glory. Consequently those that are earlier in creation are more powerful and are withdrawn only later. And for the same reason undoubtedly their pervasion is also greater.
ANTARAVIJNANADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 9
THE MENTION OF THE MIND AND INTELLECT DOES NOT INTERFERE
with the order of creation and reabsorption
as they are the products of the elements
Antara vijnanamanasi kramena tallingaditi
chet na aviseshat II.3.15 (231)
If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and the mind (are mentioned, and that therefore their origination and re-absorption are to be placed) somewhere in the series on account of their being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken), we say, not so on account of the non-difference (of the intellect and the mind from the elements).
Antara: intervening between, in between; Vijnanamanasi: the intellect and the mind; Kramena: in the order of succession, according to the successive order; Tat lingat: owing to indication of that, as there is indication in Sruti to that effect, because of an inferential mark of this; Iti: thus, this; Chet: if; Na: not, no, not so, the objection cannot stand; Aviseshat: because of no speciality, as there is no speciality mentioned in Sruti about the causation of the elements, because there being no particular difference, on account of non-difference.
A further objection to the causation of the primary elements from Brahman is raised and refuted.
The Sutra consists of two parts namely an objection and its refutation. The objection is Antara vijnanamanasi kramena tallingat iti chet. The refutation portion is Na aviseshat.
In the Atharvana (Mundaka Upanishad) in the chapter which treats of the creation occurs the following text: From this (Brahman) are born Prana, mind, the senses, ether, air, fire, water and earth, the support of all (II.1.3).
The Purvapakshin or the opponent says: The order of creation which is described in the Mundaka Upanishad contradicts the order of creation of elements described in the Chhandogya Upanishad VI.2.3, and other Srutis.
To this we reply: This is only a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements. It is not certainly a statement as to the order of their origination. The Mundaka text only states that all these are produced from Brahman.
In the Atharva Veda (Mundaka) mind, intellect and the senses are mentioned in the middle of the enumeration of the elements. This does not affect the evolutionary order, because the mind, the intellect and the senses are the effects, of the elements and their involution is included in the involution of the elements.
The intellect, the mind and the senses are products of the elements. Therefore, they can come into being only after the elements are created. The origination and reabsorption of the mind, intellect and the senses are the same as those of the elements as there is no difference between the senses and the elements.
Even if the mind, the intellect and the senses are separate from the elements, the evolutionary order is either the mind and the senses followed by the elements or the elements followed by the mind and the senses. Anyhow they have an orderly evolution.
That the mind, intellect and the organs are modifications of the elements and are of the nature of the elements is proved by Sruti texts like For the mind, my child, consists of earth, breath or vital force of water, speech of fire (Chh. Up. VI.6.5).
Hence the Mundaka text which treats of creation does not contradict the order of creation mentioned in the Chhandogya and Taittiriya Upanishads. The origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.
The Purvapakshin again says: that as there is mention in Sruti of the mind and the senses, Akasa and the other elements should not be considered to be created out of Brahman and to dissolve in Brahman but to be created out of and to dissolve in the mind and the senses according to the order of succession, as there is indication in the Mundaka to that effect.
This argument is untenable as there is no speciality mentioned in Sruti about the creation of the elements. The mind, the intellect and the senses have all without exception been stated therein as created out of Brahman.
The word `Etasmat' of that text is to be read along with every one of these i.e., Prana, mind, etc. Thus from Him is born Prana, from Him is born mind, from Him are born the senses etc.Etasmat Pranah, Etasmat Manah, etc.
CHARACHARAVYAPASRAYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 10
BIRTHS AND DEATHS ARE NOT OF THE SOUL
Characharavyapasrayastu syat tadvyapadeso bhaktah
tadbhavabhavitvat II.3.16 (232)
But the mention of that (viz., birth and death of the individual soul) is apt only with reference to the bodies of beings moving and non-moving. It is secondary or metaphorical if applied to the soul, as the existence of those terms depends on the existence of that (i.e., the body).
Characharavyapasrayah: in connection with the bodies fixed and movable; Tu: but, indeed; Syat: may be, becomes; Tadvyapadesah: mention of that, that expression, i.e., to popular expressions of births and deaths of the soul; Bhaktah: secondary, metaphorical, not literal; Tadbhavabhavitvat: on account of (those terms) depending on the existence of that. (Tadbhave: on the existence of that, i.e., the body; Bhavitvat: depending.)
The essential nature or character of the individual soul is discussed now.
A doubt may arise that the individual soul also has births and deaths because people use such expressions as Ramakrishna is born, Ramakrishna is dead and because certain ceremonies such as the Jatakarma etc., are prescribed by the scriptures at the birth and death of people.
This Sutra refutes such a doubt, and declares that the individual soul has neither birth nor death. Birth and death pertain to the body with which the soul is connected but not to the soul. If the individual soul perishes there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth).
The connection of the body with the soul is popularly called birth, and the disconnection of the soul from the body is called death in the common parlance. Scripture says, This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die (Chh. Up. VI.11.3). Hence birth and death are spoken primarily of the bodies of moving and non-moving beings and only metaphorically of the soul.
That the words `birth' and `death' have reference to the conjunction with and separation from a body merely is also shown by the following Sruti text, On being born that person assuming his body, when he passes out of the body and dies etc. (Bri. Up. IV.3.8).
The Jatakarma ceremony also has reference to the manifestation of the body only because the soul is not manifested.
Hence the birth and death belong to the body only but not to the soul.
ATMADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 11
THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ETERNAL. `IT IS NOT PRODUCED'
Natma, asruternityatvat cha tabhyah II.3.17 (233)
The individual soul is not (produced), (because) it is not (so) mentioned by the scriptures, and as it is eternal according to them (the Sruti texts).
Na: not (produced); Atma: the individual soul; Asruteh: because of no mention in Sruti, as it is not found in Sruti; Nityatvat: because of its permanence, as it is eternal; Cha: also, and; Tabhyah: from them (Srutis), according to the Srutis.
The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is being continued.
Aitareya Upanishad declares: At the beginning of creation there was only One Brahman without a second (I.1). Therefore it is not reasonable to say that the individual soul is not born, because then there was nothing but Brahman.
Again the Sruti says, As small sparks come forth from fire, thus from that Atman all Pranas, all worlds, all gods emanate (Bri. Up. II.1.20). As from a blazing fire sparks, being of the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my friend, and return thither also, (Mun. Up. II.1.1). Therefore the Purvapakshin or the objector argues that the individual soul is born at the beginning of the cycle, just as Akasa and other elements are born.
This Sutra refutes it and says that the individual soul is not born. Why? on account of the absence of scriptural statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation the Sruti texts expressly deny birth to the individual soul.
We know from scriptural passages that the soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, and that the soul has its self rooted in Brahman. A being of such a nature cannot be produced.
The scriptural passages to which we are alluding are the following: The great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman (Bri. Up. IV.4.25). The knowing self is not born, it dies not (Katha Up. I.2.18). The ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting (Katha Up. I.2.18).
It is the one Brahman without a second that enters the intellect and appears as the individual soul Having sent forth that entered into it (Tait. Up. II.6). Let me now enter those with this living self and let me then evolve names and forms (Chh. Up. VI.3.2). He entered thither to the very tips of finger-nails (Bri. Up. I.4.7).
Thou art That (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). I am Brahman (Bri. Up. I.4.10). This self is Brahman, knowing all (Bri. Up. II.5.19). All these texts declare the eternity of the soul and thus contend against the view of its having been produced.
Therefore there is in reality no difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Jiva is not created. It is not a product. It is not born just as Akasa and other elements are born. The fact of the individual soul's being non-created does not contradict the Sruti passage At the beginning there was only the Atman the one without a second (Ait. Up. I.1).
The mention of creation of souls in the other Sruti passages cited is only in a secondary sense. It does not therefore contradict the Sruti passage Having created it, It entered into it.
The doctrine that souls are born from Brahman is not correct. Those who propound this doctrine declare that if souls are born from Brahman, the scriptural statement that by knowing Brahman everything can become true, because Brahman is the cause and the knowledge of the cause will lead to the knowledge of all the objects. They say further that Brahman cannot be identified with the individual souls, because He is sinless and pure, whereas they are not so. They further say that all that is separate is an effect and that as the souls are separate they must be effects.
The souls are not separate. The Sruti declares, There is one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings (Svet. Up. VI.11). It only appears divided owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just as the ether appears divided by its connection with jars and the like. It is His connection with the intellect that leads to his being called a Jiva, or the individual soul. Ether in a pot is identical with the ether in space. All the above objections cannot stand because of the actual identity of the individual soul and Brahman. Therefore there is no contradiction of the declaration of the Sruti that by knowing Brahman we can know everything. Origination of souls has reference only to the body.
JNADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 12
THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS INTELLIGENCE
Jno'ta eva II.3 18 (234)
For this very reason (viz., that it is not created), (the individual soul is) intelligence (itself).
Jnah: intelligent, intelligence, knower; Ata eva: for this very reason, therefore.
The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is continued.
The Sankhya doctrine is that the soul is always Chaitanya or pure consciousness in its own nature.
The Vaiseshikas declare that the individual soul is not intelligent by nature, because it is not found to be intelligent in the state of deep sleep or swoon. It becomes intelligent when the soul comes to the waking state and unites with the mind. The intelligence of the soul is adventitious and is produced by the conjunction of the soul with the mind, just as for instance the quality of redness is produced in an iron rod by the conjunction of the iron rod with fire.
If the soul were eternal, essential intelligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep sleep, swoon etc. Those who wake up from sleep say that they were not conscious of anything. Therefore, as intelligence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the intelligence of the soul is adventitious only.
To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence. Intelligence constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. This we know from Sruti texts such as Brahman is knowledge and Bliss (Bri. Up. III.9.28.7). Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite (Tait. Up. II.1). Having neither inside nor outside but being altogether a mass of knowledge (Bri. Up. IV.5.13). Now if the individual soul is nothing but that Supreme Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's essential nature, just as light and heat constitute the nature of fire.
The intelligent Brahman Itself being limited by the Upadhis or limiting adjuncts such as body, mind etc., manifests as the individual soul or Jiva. Therefore, intelligence is the very nature of Jiva and is never altogether destroyed, nor even in the state of deep sleep or swoon.
Sruti texts directly declare that the individual soul is of the nature of self-luminous intelligence. He not asleep, himself looks down upon the sleeping senses (Bri. Up. IV.3.11). That person is self-illuminated (Bri. Up. IV.3.14). For there is no intermission of the knowing of the knower (Bri. Up. IV.3.30).
That the soul's nature is intelligence follows moreover from the passage (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4) where it is stated as connected with knowledge through all sense organs. He who knows let me smell this, he is the self.
You may ask, what is the use of the senses if the Atman itself is of the nature of knowledge. The senses are needed to bring about the differentiated sensations and ideas (Vrittijnana).
From the soul's essential nature being intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless; because they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense, such as smell and so on. Sruti expressly declares: Smell (organ of smell) is for the purpose of perceiving odour (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4).
The objection that sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in deep sleep, And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing though he does not see. Because there is no intermission of the seeing of the seer for it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see (Bri. Up. IV.3.23).
The non-sentiency in deep sleep is not due to absence of Chaitanya but absence of Vishaya (objects). The Jiva does not lose its power of seeing. It does not see, because there is no object to see. It has not lost its intelligence, for it is impossible. The absence of actual intellectuality is due to the absence of objects, but not to the absence of intelligence, just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.
If intelligence did not exist in deep sleep, etc., then who would be there to say that it did not exist? How could it be known? The man after waking from deep sleep says, I slept soundly. I enjoyed perfect rest. I did not know anything. He who says, I did not know anything. I enjoyed perfect rest must have been existent at that time. If it is not so how could he remember the condition of that state?
Therefore, the intelligence of the individual soul or Jiva is never lost under any condition. The reasoning of the Vaiseshikas and others is merely fallacious. It contradicts the Srutis. We therefore conclude and decide that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.
UTKRANTIGATYADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 13 (SUTRAS 19-32)
THE SIZE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL
Utkrantigatyagatinam II.3.19 (235)
(On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the soul's) passing out, going, and returning (the soul is not infinite in size; it is of atomic size).
Utkranti: passing out, coming out; Gati: going; Agatinam: returning.
The discussion on the character of the individual soul is continued.
From this up to Sutra 32 the question of the size of the soul, whether it is atomic, medium-sized or infinite is discussed. The first ten Sutras (19-28) state the arguments for the view that the individual soul is Anu (atomic). The next four Sutras give the reply.
Svetasvatara Upanishad declares He is the one God, all-pervading (VI.11). Mundaka Sruti says, This Atman is atomic (III.1.9). The two texts contradict each other and we have to arrive at a decision on the point.
It has been shown above that the soul is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes its nature. Therefore it follows that it is identical with the Supreme Brahman. The infinity of the Supreme Brahman is expressly declared in the Srutis. What need then is there of a discussion of the size of the soul? True, we reply. But Sruti texts which speak of the soul's passing out from the body (Utkranti), going (Gati) and returning (Agati), establish the prima facie view that the soul is of limited size. Further, the Sruti clearly declares in some places that the soul is of atomic size. The present discussion is therefore begun in order to clear this doubt.
The opponent or Purvapakshin holds that the soul must be of limited atomic size owing to its being said to pass out, go and return. Its passing out is mentioned in Kaushitaki Upanishad (III.3), And when he passes out of this body he passes out together with all these. Its going is said in Kaushitaki Upanishad (I.2), All who depart from this world go to the moon. Its returning is seen in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (IV.4.6), From that world he returns again to this world of action. From these statements as to the soul's passing out from the body, going to heaven, etc., and returning from there to this world, it follows that it is of limited size. Because motion is not possible in the case of an all-pervading being. If the soul is infinite, how can it rise, or go or come? Therefore the soul is atomic.
Svatmana chottarayoh II.3.20 (236)
And on account of the latter two (i.e., going and returning) being connected with their soul (i.e., agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
Svatmana: (being connected) directly with the agent, the soul; Cha: and, only, also; Uttarayoh: of the latter two, namely, of Gati and Agati, of the going away and coming back, as stated in the previous Sutra.
An argument in support of Sutra 19 is given in this Sutra.
Even if it can be said that `passing out' means only disconnection with the body, how can they who say that the soul is infinite explain its going to the moon or returning from there?
Even if the soul is infinite still it can be spoken of as passing out, out of the body, if by that term is meant ceasing to be the ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its former actions having become exhausted, just as somebody, when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said to `go out'. The passing away from the body may mean only cessation of the exercise of a definite function just as in the case of a man no longer retained in office.
But the two latter activities viz., going to the moon, returning from there to the world, are impossible for an all-pervading soul.
Hence the soul is atomic in size.
Nanuratacchruteriti chet, na, itaradhikarat II.3.21 (237)
If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise, (i.e., all-pervading), (we say) not so, because (the one) other than the individual soul (i.e., the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self) is the subject matter (of those passages).
Na: not; Anu: minute, atomic; Atat: not that, otherwise, namely opposite of Anu; Sruteh: as it is stated in Sruti, because of a Sruti or scriptural text; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not; Itara: other than the individual soul, i.e., the Supreme Self; Adhikarat: because of the context or topic, from the subject matter of the portion in the Chapter.
An objection to Sutra 19 is raised and refuted.
The Sutra consists of an objection and its answer. The objection-portion is Nanuratacchruteriti chet and the answer- portion is Na itaradhikarat.
The passages which describe the soul and infinite apply only to Supreme Brahman and not to the individual soul.
Sruti passages like He is the one God, who is hidden in all beings, all-pervading, etc. (Svet. Up. VI.11), He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Pranas, the ether within the heart. (Bri. Up. IV.4.22), Like the ether He is Omnipresent, eternal, Truth, Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman (Tait. Up. II.1)refer not to the Jiva or the individual soul with its limitations, but to the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self, who is other than the individual soul, and forms the chief subject matter of all the Vedanta texts, because Brahman is the one thing that is to be known or realised intuitively and is therefore propounded by all the Vedanta passages.
Svasabdonmanabhyam cha II.3.22 (238)
And on account of direct statements (of the Sruti texts as to the atomic size) and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic).
Svasabdonmanabhyam: from direct statements (of Sruti texts) and infinitesimal measure; Cha: and. (Svasabda: the word itself; the word directly denoting `minute'; Unmanabhyam: on account of the measure of comparison; Ut: subtle; Mana: measure, hence subtle division; hence smaller even than the small. Svasabdonmanabhyam: as these are the words directly denoting `minute' and to expression denoting smaller than the small as measured by division.)
The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.
The soul must be atomic because the Sruti expressly says so and calls him infinitely small.
Mundaka Sruti declares, This Atma is atomic (III.1.9). Svetasvatara Upanishad says, The individual is of the size of the hundredth part of a part, which itself is one hundredth part of the point of a hair (V.9); That lower one also is seen small even like the point of a goad.
Therefore the soul is atomic in size.
But an objection may here be raised. If the soul is of atomic size, it will occupy a point of the body only. Then the sensation which extends over the whole body would appear contrary to reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that those who take bath in the Ganga experience the sensation of cold all over their whole bodies. In summer people feel hot all over the body. The following Sutra gives a suitable answer to the objection.
Avirodhaschandanavat II.3.23 (239)
There is no contradiction as in the case of sandal paste.
Avirodhah: non-conflict, no contradiction, no incongruity, it is not incongruous; Chandanavat: like the sandal paste.
The argument in support of Sutra 19 is continued.
Just as one drop of sandal-wood paste, smeared on one part of the body makes the whole body thrill with joy, so also the individual soul, though naturally minute, manifests itself throughout the whole body and experiences all the sensations of pleasure and pain. Though the soul is atomic it may experience pleasure and pain extending over the whole body. Though the soul is atomic still it is possible that it pervades the entire body, just as a drop of sandal paste although in actual contact with one particular spot of the body only pervades, i.e., causes refreshing sensation all over the body.
As the soul is connected with the skin which is the seat of feeling, the assumption that the soul's sensations should extend over the whole body is not contrary to reason because the connection of the soul and the skin abides in the entire skin and the skin extends over the entire body.
adhyupagamaddhridi hi II.3.24 (240)
If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul), we deny that, on account of the acknowledgement (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz., within the heart.
Avasthiti: existence, residence, abode; Vaiseshyat: because of the speciality, on account of specialisation; Iti: thus, this; Chet: if (if it be argued); Na: not (so), no, the argument cannot stand; Adhyupagamat: on account of the admission, or acknowledgment; Hridi: in the heart; Hi: indeed.
An objection to Sutra 23 is raised and refuted by the opponent or Purvapakshin.
The Sutra consists of two parts namely, an objection, and its reply. The objection-portion is: `Avasthitivaiseshyaditi chet', and the reply portion is: `Nabhyupagamaddhridi hi'.
The Purvapakshin or the objector raises an objection against his own view. The argumentation relied upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two cases compared are not parallel. The similarity is not exact. The analogy is faulty or inappropriate. In the case of the sandal paste, it occupies a particular point of the body and refreshes the entire body. But in the case of the soul it does not exist in any particular locality but is percipient of all sensations throughout the entire body. We do not know that it has a particular abode or special seat. When there is no special seat, for the soul, we cannot infer that it must have a particular abode in the body like the sandal paste and therefore be atomic. Because, even an all-pervading soul like ether, or a soul pervading the entire body like the skin may produce the same result.
We cannot reason like this: the soul is atomic because it causes effects extending over the entire body like a drop of sandal ointment, because that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch, the skin also, which we know not to be of atomic size. Therefore it is not easy to decide the size of the soul when there is no positive proof.
The opponent refutes the above objection by quoting such Sruti texts as: The soul abides within the heart (Pras. Up. III.6), The self is in the heart (Chh. Up. VIII.3.3), The Self abides in the heart (Bri. Up. IV.3.7), Who is that self? He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge, expressly declare that the soul has a special abode or particular seat in the body, viz., the heart. Therefore it is atomic.
The analogy is not faulty. It is quite appropriate. The two cases are parallel. Hence the argumentation resorted to in Sutra 23 is not objectionable.
Gunadva alokavat II.3.25 (241)
Or on account of (its) quality (viz., intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience (such as in the case of a lamp by its light).
Gunat: on account of its quality (of intelligence); Va: or (a further example is given); Alokavat: like a light. (Or Lokavat: as in the world, as in cases of ordinary experience).
The argument in support of Sutra 23 is continued.
Or it is like a small light which, by its own virtue, illuminates the whole house. The soul, though atomic and occupies a particular portion of the body, may pervade the whole body by its quality of intelligence as the flame pervades the whole room by its rays and thus experiences pleasure and pain throughout the whole body.
A further example is given by way of comparison to show how an atomic soul can have experience throughout the entire body.
Vyatireko gandhavat II.3.26 (242)
The extension (of the quality of intelligence) beyond (the soul in which it inheres) is like the odour (which extends beyond the fragrant object).
Vyatirekah: expansion, extension beyond (the object i.e., soul); Gandhavat: like the odour.
Sutra 23 is further elucidated by this Sutra.
Just as the sweet fragrance of flowers extends beyond them and diffuses throughout a larger space, so also the intelligence of the soul, which is atomic, extends beyond the soul and pervades the entire body.
If it be said that even the analogy in the above Sutra is not appropriate, because a quality cannot be apart from the substance, and hence the light of a lamp is only the lamp in its tenuous form, the analogy of perfume will apply. Just as though a flower is far away its scent is felt around, so though the soul is atomic its cognition of the entire body is possible. This analogy cannot be objected on the ground that even the fragrance of a flower is only the subtle particles of the flower, because our experience is that we feel the fragrance and not any particles.
Tatha cha darsayati II.3.27 (243)
Thus also, (the Sruti) shows or declares.
Tatha: thus, in the same way; Cha: also; Darsayati: (the Sruti) declares.
The Sruti also, after having signified the soul's abiding in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such passages as Upto the hairs, upto the tips of the nails (Kau. Up. IV.20, Bri. Up. I.4.7), that the soul pervades the whole body by means of intelligence, which is its quality.
Prithagupadesat II.3.28 (244)
On account of the separate teaching (of the Sruti) (that the soul pervades the body on account of its quality of intelligence).
Prithak: separate, different; Upadesat: because of teaching or statement.
This Sutra is a defence in favour of the preceding Sutra where intelligence is used as an attribute of the individual soul and so separate from it.
A further argument is given here to establish the proposition of the previous Sutra. Kaushitaki Upanishad declares Having by Prajna, (intelligence, knowledge,) taken possession of the body (III.6). This indicates that intelligence is different from the soul being related as instrument and agent and the soul pervades the entire body with this quality of intelligence.
Again the text Thou the intelligent person having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence (Bri. Up. II.1.17) shows intelligence to be different from the agent, i.e., the Jiva or the individual soul and so likewise confirms our views.
Though there is no fundamental difference between the individual soul and his intelligence, they are different in the sense that intelligence is the attribute of the individual soul which is the substance. The individual soul is the possessor of that attribute, because the Sruti states a difference between the two.
Tadgunasaratvat tu tadvyapadesah prajnavat II.3.29 (245)
But that declaration (as to the atomic size of the soul) is on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi), as in the case of the intelligent Lord (Saguna Brahman).
Tadgunasaratvat: on account of its possessing for its essence the qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi); Tu: but; Tadvyapadesah: that declaration (as to its atomic size); Prajnavat: as in the case of the Intelligent Lord.
The discussion on the true character of the individual soul, commenced in Sutra 16 is continued.
The word `tu' (but), refutes all that has been said in Sutras 19-28 and decides that the soul is all-pervading.
The next four Sutras are the Siddhanta Sutras which lay down the correct doctrine.
The soul is not of atomic size as the Sruti does not declare it to have had an origin. The scripture declares that the Supreme Brahman entered the universe as the individual soul and that the individual soul is identical with Brahman, and that the individual soul is nothing else but the Supreme Brahman. If the soul is the Supreme Brahman, it must be of the same extent as Brahman. The scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.
Your argument is that though the soul is Anu, it can cognise all that goes on in the body because of its contact with the skin. But that argument is untenable because when a thorn pricks we feel pain only in the pricked spot. Moreover, your analogy of the lamp and its light and of the flower and its fragrance has no real applicability, because a Guna (quality) can never be apart from the substance (Guna). The light and the perfume are only subtle portions of the flame and the flower. Further, as Chaitanya is the nature or Svarupa of the soul, the soul also must be of the size of the body if there is cognition of the whole body. This latter doctrine has been already refuted. Therefore the soul must be infinite.
The Jiva is declared to be atomic by reason of its identification with the Buddhi.
According to the extent of intellect, the size of the individual soul has been fixed. It is imagined that the soul is connected with the Buddhi or intellect and bound. Passing out, going and coming are qualities of the intellect and are superimposed on the Jiva or the individual soul. The soul is considered to be atomic on account of the limitation of the intellect. That the non-transmigrating eternally free Atman, which neither acts nor enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the Buddhi is due only to its having the qualities of the Buddhi (intellect) for its essence, viz., as long as it is in fictitious connection with the Buddhi. It is similar to imagining the all-pervading Lord as limited for the sake of Upasana or worship.
Svetasvatara Upanishad (V.9) says, That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite. This Sruti text at first states the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite. This is appropriate only if the atomicity of the soul is metaphorical and its infinity is real, because both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at the same time. The infinity certainly cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense, as all the Upanishads aim at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
The other passage (Svet. Up. V.8) which treats of the measure of the soul The lower one endowed with the quality of mind and the quality of the body, is seen small even like the point of a goad teaches the soul's small size to depend on its connection with the qualities of the Buddhi, not upon its own Self.
Mundaka Upanishad declares, That small (Anu) Self is to be known by thought (III.1.9). This Upanishad does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, as the subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be fathomed by the eye, etc., but to be realised by the light of knowledge. Further, the soul cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.
Therefore the statement about Anutva (smallness, subtlety) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts.
The Buddhi abides in the heart. So it is said that the soul abides in the heart. Really the soul is all-pervading.
As the soul is involved in the Samsara and as it has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjunct viz., Buddhi, it is spoken of as minute.
Yavadatmabhavitvacca na doshastaddarsanat II.3.30 (246)
And there is no defect or fault in what has been said in the previous Sutra (as the conjunction of the soul with the intellect exists) so long as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; because it is so seen (in the scriptures).
Yavat: so long as; Atmabhavitvat: as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; Cha: also, and; Na doshah: there is no defect or fault; Taddarsanat: because it is so seen (in the scriptures), as Sruti also shows that.
An additional reason is given in support of Sutra 29.
The Purvapakshin or the opponent raises an objection. Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory condition of the soul is due to the qualities of the intellect forming its essence. It will follow from this that, as the conjunction of the intellect and soul which are different entities must necessarily come to an end, the soul when disjoined from the intellect will either cease to exist altogether or at least cease to be a Samsarin (individual soul).
To this objection this Sutra gives a reply. There can be no such defect in the argument of the previous Sutra, because this connection with the Buddhi (intellect) lasts so long as the soul's state of Samsara is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge. As long as the soul's connection with the Buddhi, its limiting adjunct lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual soul, involved in transmigratory existence.
There is no Jiva or individual soul without identification with intellect. The connection of the soul with the intellect will cease only by right knowledge. The scripture declares I know that Person of sunlike lustre beyond darkness. A man who knows Him passes over death, there is no other path to go (Svet. Up. III.8).
How is it known that the soul is connected with the Buddhi as long as it exists? We reply, because that is seen, viz., in scripture. It is known from the Srutis that this connection is not severed even at death. The scripture declares, He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, surrounded by Pranas, the person of light, he remaining the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving (Bri. Up. IV.3.7). Here the term consisting of knowledge means `consisting of Buddhi'. The passage He remaining in the same wanders along the two worlds declares that the Self, even when going to another world, is not separated from the Buddhi etc. The term as if thinking, as if moving mean that the individual soul does not think and move on its own account, but only through its association with the Buddhi. The individual soul thinks as it were, and moves as it were, because the intellect to which it is joined really moves and thinks.
The connection of the individual soul with the intellect, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge. Wrong knowledge (Mithyajnana) cannot cease except through perfect knowledge. Therefore, as long as there does not arise the realisation of Brahman or Brahmajnana, so long the connection of the soul with the intellect and its other limiting adjuncts does not come to an end.
Pumstvadivat tvasya sato'bhivyaktiyogat II.3.31 (247)
On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connection) which exists (potentially) like virile power, etc.
Pumstvadivat: like the virile power etc.; Tu: verily, but; Asya: its, i.e., of the connection with the intellect; Satah: existing; Abhivyaktiyogat: on account of the manifestation being possible, because of appropriateness of the manifestation.
A proof is now given in support of Sutra 29 by showing the perpetual connection between the individual soul and the intellect. The word `tu' (but), is used in order to set aside the objection raised above.
An objection is raised that in Sushupti or deep sleep and Pralaya there can be no connection with the intellect, as the scripture declares, Then he becomes united with the True; he is gone to his own (Chh. Up. VI.8.1). How then can it be said that the connection with the intellect lasts so long as the individual soul exists?
The Sutra refutes it and says that this connection exists in a subtle or potential form even in deep sleep. Had it not been for this, it could not have become manifest in the waking state. Such connection is clear from the appropriateness of such connection becoming manifest during creation, after dissolution and during the waking state after sleep, as in the case of virility dormant in boyhood and manifest in manhood.
The connection of the soul with the intellect exists potentially during deep sleep and the period of dissolution and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.
Virile power becomes manifest in manhood only if it exists in a fine or potential state in the body. Hence this connection with the intellect lasts so long as the soul exists in its Samsara-state.
va'nyatha II.3.32 (248)
Otherwise (if no intellect existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e., of the soul or of the senses).
Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasangat: there would result perpetual perception or non-perception; Anyatara: otherwise, either of the two; Niyamah: restrictive rule; Va: or; Anyatha: otherwise. (Upalabdhi: perception, consciousness; Anupalabdhi: non-perception, non-consciousness.)
The internal organ (Antahkarana) which constitutes the limiting adjunct of the soul is called in different places by different names such as Manas (mind), Buddhi (intellect), Vijnana (knowledge), and Chitta (thought) etc. When it is in a state of doubt it is called Manas; when it is in a state of determination it is called Buddhi. Now we must necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal organ, because otherwise there would result either perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception. There would be perpetual perception whenever there is a conjunction of the soul, and senses and the objects of senses, the three together forming the instruments of perception. Or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect did not follow, there would be perpetual non-perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually observed.
Or else we will have to accept the limitation of the power either of the soul or of the senses. But the limiting of power is not possible, as the Atman is changeless. It cannot be said that the power of the senses which is not obstructed either in the previous moment or in the subsequent moment is limited in the middle.
Therefore we have to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ (Antahkarana) through whose connection and disconnection perception and non-perception take place. The scripture declares, My mind was elsewhere, I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for a man sees with his mind and hears with the mind (Bri. Up. I.5.3). The scripture further shows that desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.
Therefore there exists an internal organ, the Antahkarana, and the connection of the soul with the internal organ causes the Atman to appear as the individual soul or as the soul its Samsara state as explained in Sutra 29. The explanation given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.
KARTRADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 14 (SUTRAS 38-39)
THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS AN AGENT
Karta sastrarthavattvat II.3.33 (249)
(The soul is) an agent on account of the scripture having a purport thereby.
Karta: agent; Sastrarthavattvat: in order that the scriptures may have a meaning, on account of the scriptures having a purport.
Another characteristic of the individual soul is being stated.
The question as regards the size of the soul has been stated. Now another characteristic of the soul is taken up for discussion. The Jiva is a doer or an agent, for otherwise the scriptural injunctions will be useless. On that assumption scriptural injunctions such as He is to sacrifice, He is to make an oblation into the fire, He is to give, etc., have a purport, otherwise they would be purportless. The scriptures enjoin certain acts to be done by the agent. If the soul be not an agent these injunctions would become meaningless. On that supposition there is meaning to the following passage also, For, it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he is the person whose self is knowledge (Pras. Up. IV.9). He who desires to attain heaven, has to perform sacrifices; and he, who desires to attain salvation, has to worship Brahman in meditation.
Viharopadesat II.3.34 (250)
And on account of (the Sruti) teaching (its) wandering about.
Vihara: wandering at will, play, sporting about; Upadesat: on account of declaration, as Sruti declares.
An argument in support of Sutra 33 is given.
The Sruti declares The immortal one goes wherever he likes (Bri. Up. IV.3.12), and again He taking the senses along with him moves about according to his pleasure, within his own body (Bri. Up. II.1.18). These passages which give a description of the wandering of the soul in the dream indicate clearly that the soul is an agent.
Upadanat II.3.35 (251)
(Also it is a doer) on account of its taking the organs.
Upadanat: on account of its taking (the organs).
Another argument in support of Sutra 33 is given.
The text quoted in the last Sutra also indicates that the soul in dream state takes the organs with it. Having taken through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence, and having taken the senses (Bri. Up. II.1.18, 19). This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.
It is a doer or an agent because it is said to use the senses. The individual soul is to be admitted as the agent, because he is described in Sruti to take the senses along with him as instruments of his work, while roaming within his own body during the dream state. Thus, he taking the senses along with him, moves about within his own body, just as he pleases. (Bri. Up. II.1.18).
In the Gita also we find when the soul acquires a body and when he abandons it, he seizes these and goes with them, as the wind takes fragrance from the flowers (Gita. XV.8).
Vyapadesaccha kriyayam na chennirdesaviparyayah II.3.36 (252)
(The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not so, there would be a change of designation.
Vyapadesat: on account of mention, from a statement of Sruti; Cha: also, and; Kriyayam: in respect of performance of rites; Na chet: if it were not so, or else, otherwise; Nirdesaviparyayah: reversal of the statement, change of designation.
The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.
In the passage Vijnanam yajnam tanute, Karmani tanute'pi chaIntelligence (i.e., the intelligent person, Jiva) performs sacrifices, and it also performs all acts (Tait. Up.II.5), by `Intelligence' the soul is meant and not the Buddhi. This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.
Vijnana refers to Jiva and not to Buddhi, because if Buddhi is referred to, the word would be `Vijnanena'. The nominative case in `Vijnanam yajnam tanute', should be instrumental case, `Vijnanena', `by intelligence' meaning through its instrumentality.
We see that in another text where the Buddhi is meant the word `intelligence' is exhibited in the instrumental case Having through the intelligence of these senses it takes all understanding (Bri.Up. II.1.17). In the passage under discussion, on the contrary, the word `intelligence' is given in the characteristic of the agent, viz., nominative case and therefore indicates the soul which is distinct from the Buddhi.
Upalabdhivadaniyamah II.3.37 (253)
As in the case of perception (there is) no rule (here also).
Upalabdhivat: as in the case of perception; Aniyamah: (there is) no rule.
The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.
An objection is raised that if the soul were a free agent, then why should he do any act productive of harmful effects? He would have done only what is beneficial to him and not both good and evil actions.
This objection is refuted in this Sutra. Just as the soul, although he is free, perceives both pleasant and unpleasant things, so also he performs both good and evil actions. There is no rule that he should perform only what is beneficial and avoid what is bad or harmful.
In the performance of actions, the soul is not absolutely free as he depends on differences of place, time and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he is in need of assistance. A cook remains the agent in action of cooking, although he needs fuel, water, etc. His function as a cook exists at all times.
Saktiviparyayat II.3.38 (254)
On account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).
Saktiviparyayat: on account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).
The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.
If the Buddhi which is an instrument becomes the agent and ceases to function as an instrument there would take place a reversal of power, i.e., the instrumental power which pertains to the Buddhi would have to be set aside and to be replaced by the power of an agent.
If the Buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-consciousness (Aham-pratyaya), as we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness: I go, I come, I eat, I drink, I do, I enjoy.
If the Buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and affects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it affects everything, because every doer needs an instrument. Hence the whole dispute is about a name only. There is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent. In either case an agent different from the instrument has to be admitted.
Samadhyabhavaccha II.3.39 (255)
And on account of the impossibility of Samadhi.
Samadhyabhavat: on account of the impossibility of Samadhi; Cha: and, also. (Samadhi: superconscious state; Abhavat: for want, for impossibility, as it becomes an impossible thing).
The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.
If the soul is not a doer, there will be non-existence of attainment of liberation. If the Jiva or soul is not an agent, then the realisation prescribed by Sruti texts like The Atman is to be realised (Bri. Up. II.4.5.) through Samadhi would be impossible. The meditation taught in the Vedanta texts is possible only if the soul is the agent. Verily, the Atman is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be searched. The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1.) Meditate on the Self as OM (Mun. Up. II.2.6). Therefrom also it follows that the soul is an agent.
The soul will not be capable of practising hearing, reasoning, reflection, and meditation which lead to Samadhi and the attainment of Knowledge of the Imperishable. Hence there will be no emancipation for the soul. Therefore it is established that the soul alone is the agent, but not the Buddhi.
TAKSHADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 15
THE SOUL IS AN AGENT AS LONG AS IT IS LIMITED BY THE ADJUNCTS
Yatha cha takshobhayatha II.3.40 (256)
And as the carpenter is both.
Yatha: as; Cha: also, and; Taksha: the carpenter; Ubhayatha: in both ways, is both.
The argument in support of Sutra 33 is continued.
That the individual soul is an agent has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sutras 33 to 39. We now have to consider whether this agency is its real nature or only a superimposition due to its limiting adjuncts. The Nyaya School maintains that it is its very nature.
This Sutra refutes it and declares that it is superimposed on the soul and not real. Such doership is not the soul's nature, because if it is so, there could be no liberation, just as fire, being hot in its nature, can never be free from heat. Doing is essentially of the nature of pain. You cannot say that even if there is the power of doing, emancipation can come when there is nothing to do, because the power of doing will result in doing at some time or other. The Sruti calls the Atman as having an eternally pure conscious and free nature. How could that be if doership is its nature? Hence, its doership is due to its identification with a limiting function. So there is no soul as doer or enjoyer apart from Para-Brahman. You cannot say that in that case God will become a Samsarin, because doership and enjoyment are due only to Avidya.
The body of the carpenter is not the cause of his function. His tools are the cause. Even so the soul is a doer only through the mind and the senses. The scriptural injunctions do not command doing but command acts to be done on the basis of such doership which is due to Avidya.
The Sruti declares This Atman is non-attached (Bri. Up. IV.3.15). Just as in ordinary life, a carpenter suffers when he is working with his tools and is happy when he leaves his work, so does the Atman suffer when he is active in the waking and dream states through his connection with the intellect, etc., and is blissful when he ceases to be an agent as in the state of deep sleep.
The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts refer to the conditioned state of the self. By nature the soul is inactive. It becomes active through connection with its Upadhis or limiting adjuncts, the intellect, etc. Doership really belongs to the intellect. Eternal Upalabdhi or Consciousness is in the soul. Doership implies Ahamkara or ego-consciousness. Hence such doership does not belong to the soul as its nature but belongs to the intellect.
The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose an agentship established somehow on account of Avidya or ignorance, but do not themselves aim at establishing the direct agentship of the Self. The agentship of the Self does not constitute its real nature because scripture teaches that its true Self is Brahman. We, therefore, conclude that the Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agentship of the soul which is due to Avidya.
Nor can you infer doership from the description of Vihara (play or activity) in dreams, because the connection with the mind or intellect continues in dreams. Even in the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not altogether at rest; because scripture declares that even then it is connected with the Buddhi. Having become a dream, together with Buddhi, it passes beyond this world. Smriti also says, when the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know to be a dream.
It is clearly established that the agentship of the soul is due to its limiting adjunct Buddhi only.
PARAYATTADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 16 (SUTRAS 41-42)
THE SOUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE LORD, WHEN HE WORKS
Parattu tat sruteh II.3.41 (257)
But (even) that (agency of the soul) is from the Supreme Lord, so declares the Sruti.
Parat: from the Supreme Lord; Tu: but, indeed; Tat: agency, agentship; Sruteh: from Sruti, so declares the Sruti.
A limitation to Sutra 33 is stated.
We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship characterising the individual soul in the state of ignorance on account of its limiting adjuncts is independent of the Lord or dependent on Him.
The Purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord.
The word `tu' (but), is employed in order to remove the doubt raised by the Purvapakshin. The view that the soul's doership is due to its desires and its possession of the senses as instruments and not to the Lord is wrong, because the Sruti declares that Lord is the cause.
The agency of the soul is also due to the Supreme Lord. It can be understood from Sruti that the agentship of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The soul does good and bad deeds being so directed by the Lord.
Sruti declares, He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do good deeds; He makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds. (Kau. Up. III.8) and, again, He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within (Sat. Br. XIV.6.7.30). The Universal Soul entering within, governs the individual soulsAntah pravishtah sasta jivanam The Lord is within all, the Ruler of all creatures.
You cannot say that that will cause the attribution of partiality (Vaishamya) and cruelty (Nairghrinya) to the Lord, because He acts according to Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit). You may reply that these are due to doership and if doership is due to the Lord, how can the Lord act according to Dharma and Adharma?
We reply that the Sruti says that the soul is the doer and declares as cause of doership the Supreme Lord who is the bestower of the fruits of actions, who is immanent in all, who is the witness of all actions, and who is the inspirer and guider of all.
vihitapratishiddhavaiyarthyadibhyah II.3.42 (258)
But (the Lord's making the soul act) depends on the works done (by it), for otherwise there will be uselessness of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.
Kritaprayatnapekshah: depends on works done; Tu: but; Vihita-pratishiddha-avaiyarthyadibhyah: so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions may not be meaningless. (Vihita: ordained; Pratishiddha: prohibited; Avaiyarthyadibhyah: on account of non-meaninglessness.)
This Sutra proceeds to narrow the scope of Sutra 41 within certain limits.
If causal agency belongs to the Lord, it follows that He must be cruel and unjust and that the soul has to undergo consequences of what it has not done. He must be cruel and whimsical too as He makes some persons do good acts and others evil deeds. This Sutra refutes this doubt.
The word `tu' (but), removes the objections. The Lord always directs the soul according to its good or bad actions done in previous births. He bestows good and bad fruits according to the soul's good and bad actions. He is the rain which always causes each seed to fructify according to its power. Though doership is dependent on the Lord, doing is the soul's act. What the soul does the Lord causes to be done. Such doing is due to deeds done in previous birth and Vasanas which, again, are due to previous Karmas and so on, Samsara being without beginning (Anadi). As Samsara is beginningless there will always be previous births with actions performed in those births for the guidance of the Lord. Hence He cannot be accused of being cruel, unjust and whimsical. To give fruits the Lord depends on the soul's actions. If this were not so, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. If Lord does not depend on the soul's actions for giving fruit, effort or exertion (Purushartha) will have no place at all. The soul will gain nothing by following these injunctions.
Moreover, time, place and causation will be capriciously operative and not according to the law of cause and effect, if our Karma is not the instrumental cause, and the Lord the Supervising Cause.
AMSADHIKARANAM: TOPIC 17 (SUTRAS 43-53)
RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL TO BRAHMAN
Amso nanavyapadesad anyatha chapi
dasakitavaditvamadhiyata eke II.3.43 (259)
(The soul is) a part of the Lord on account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise also (i.e., as non-different from Brahman); because in some (Vedic texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fishermen, knaves, etc.
Amsah: part; Nanavyapadesat: on account of difference being declared; Anyatha: otherwise; Cha: and; Api: also; Dasakitavaditvam: being fisher-men, knaves, etc.; Adhiyata: read; Eke: some (Srutis, Sakhas of the Vedas).
This Sutra shows that the individual soul is different from as well as the same with Brahman.
In the last topic it has been shown that the Lord rules the soul. Now the question of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman is taken up. Is it that of master and servant or as between fire and its sparks?
The Purvapakshin holds that the relation is like that of master and servant, because that connection only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and ruled (subject).
To this the Sutra says that the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire. But then the soul is not actually a part, but a part as it were. It is an imagined part only, because Brahman cannot have any parts. Brahman is Nishkala, without parts. He is Akhanda (indivisible). He is Niravayava (without limbs).
Why then should it be taken as a part and not identical with the Lord? Because the scriptures declare a difference between them in texts like That self it is which we must search out, that it is we must try to understand (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). He who knows Him becomes a Muni (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). He who dwelling within the self, pulls the self from within (Bri. Up. III.7.23). The Atman is to be seen? (Bri. Up. II.4.5). This difference is spoken of from the relative viewpoint. They are identical from the absolute viewpoint.
The text Brahman is the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers etc., indicate that even such low persons are in reality Brahman and that all individual souls, men, women and children are all Brahman.
The same viewpoint is set forth in other passages such as Thou art woman, Thou art man, Thou art the youth, Thou art the maiden; Thou as an old man totters along on Thy staff, Thou art born with Thy face turned everywhere (Svet. Up. IV.3). Texts like There is no other but He and similar ones establish the same truth. Non-differentiated intelligence belongs to the soul and the Lord alike, just as heat belongs to the sparks as well as the fire.
From these two views of difference, and non-difference, there results the comprehensive view of the soul being a part of the Lord.
Mantravarnaccha II.3.44 (260)
Also from the words of the Mantra (it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).
Mantravarnat: from the words of the Mantra, from the letters in sacred verses, because of description given in the sacred Mantras; Cha: also, and.
An argument in support of Sutra 43, that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is given.
A further reason is given to show that the soul is a part of the Lord. Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot of It are all these beings, three feet of It are the immortal in heaven, (Chh. Up. III.12.6) where beings including souls are said to be a foot or part of the Lord.
(One foot, i.e., the fourth part of Him are all beings, the whole creation covers only a fraction of Him). Purusha Sukta: Rigveda: X.90.3, declares the same thing. All the beings are but a foot of Him.
The word `pada' and `amsa' are identical. Both mean part or a portion.
Hence we conclude that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, and again from the following reason.
Api cha smaryate II.3.45 (261)
And it is so stated in the Smriti.
Api: also; Cha: and; Smaryate: it is (so) stated in the Smriti.
The argument that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is concluded here.
The Smriti also says sothat the individual soul is a part of Brahman. An eternal portion of Myself becomes the individual soul in the world of life (Bhagavad Gita: XV.7).
Prakasadivannaivam parah II.3.46 (262)
The Supreme Lord is not (affected by pleasure and pain) like this (individual soul) just as light (is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections).
Prakasadivat: like light, etc.; Na: is not; Evam: thus, like this, like the individual soul; Parah: the Supreme Lord.
The speciality of the Supreme Lord is shown in this Sutra.
Here the Purvapakshin raises another objection. If the soul is a part of the Lord, the Lord also must experience pleasure and pain like the soul. We see in ordinary life that the entire Ramakrishna suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some other limb. Hence attainment of God would mean maximum grief and pain, and the old limited pain of individual soul would be far better.
This Sutra refutes it. The Lord does not experience pleasure and pain like the individual soul. The individual soul identifies itself with the body, the senses and the mind, on account of ignorance, and therefore experiences pleasure and pain. The Supreme Lord neither identifies himself with a body, nor imagines himself to be afflicted by pain.
The pain of the individual soul also is not real but imaginary only. It is due to non-discrimination of the Self from the body, senses and mind which are the products of Avidya or ignorance.
Just as a man feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so also he feels the pain which affects others such as sons or friends, by erroneously identifying himself with them. He enters as it were into them through Moha or love and imagines I am the son, I am the friend. This clearly shows that the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagination.
Some men and women are sitting together and talking. If then somebody calls out the son has died, grief is produced in the minds of those who have Moha or love for sons on account of erroneous imagination, identification, and connection, but not in the minds of religious ascetics or Sannyasins who have freed themselves from that imagination. If even a man of right knowledge who has become an ascetic has no pain or grief consequent on death of relations or friends, God who is Supreme and alone, who is pure consciousness, who is eternal pure intelligence, who sees nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects, can have no pain at all.
To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison like light etc. Just as the light of the sun which is all-pervading becomes straight or bent by coming in contact with particular objects, but does not really become so, or the ether of a pot seems to move when the pot is moved, but does not really move, or as the sun does not tremble although its image which is reflected in water trembles, so also the Lord is not affected by pleasure, pain or grief although pleasure and pain etc., are felt by that part of Him, which is called the individual soul which is a product of ignorance and is limited by Buddhi, etc.
Just as the sun does not become contaminated by its touch through its parts, the rays with the impurities of the earth, so also the Supreme Lord does not become affected by the enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul, though latter is part and parcel of the former.
When the soul's individual state due to ignorance is sublated, it becomes Brahman, Thou art That etc. Thus the Supreme Lord is not affected by the pain of the individual soul.
Smaranti Cha II.3.47 (263)
The Smritis also state (that).
Smaranti: the Smritis state; Cha: and, also.
Of the two, the Supreme Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities. It is not touched by the fruits of actions, any more than a lotus leaf by water. The Smriti texts like these state that the Supreme Lord does not experience pleasure and pain.
Anujnapariharau dehasambandhajjyotiradivat II.3.48 (264)
Injunctions and prohibitions (are possible) on account of the connection (of the Self) with the body, as in the case of light, etc.
Anujnapariharau: injunctions and prohibitions; Dehasamban- dhat: on account of connection with the body; Jyotiradivat: like light etc.
The necessity for observance of mandatory and prohibitory rules is explained.
The Atman or the Supreme Self is one. There can be no injunctions and prohibitions with regard to the Atman. But injunctions and prohibitions are possible when it is connected with a body. What are those permissions and injunctions? He is to approach his wife at the proper time. He is not to approach the wife of his Guru. He is to kill the animal devoted to Agnistoma. and He is not to hurt any being.
Fire is one only but the fire of the funeral pyre is rejected and that of a sacrifice is accepted. Some things consisting of earth, like diamonds, are desired; other things consisting of earth, like dead bodies, are shunned. The urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as such; those of other animals are rejected. Water poured from a clean vessel or offered by a clean person is to be accepted; that contained in an unclean vessel or offered by an unclean man is to be rejected. Similar is the case with the Atman.
When the soul is in a state of attachment to the body, ethical ideas of purity and impurity have full application.
Asantateschavyatikarah II.3.49 (265)
And on account of the non-extension (of the soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of results of actions).
Asantateh: on account of non-extension (beyond its own body); Cha: and; Avyatikarah: there is no confusion (of results of actions).
The discussion on the special characteristic of the individual soul is continued.
An objection is raised that on account of the unity of the self there would result a confusion of the results of actions, there being only one master, i.e., one soul to enjoy the fruits of actions. This Sutra refutes such a possibility.
This is not so, because there is no extension of the acting and enjoying self, i.e., no connection on its part with all bodies. The individual soul depends on its adjuncts, and there is also non-extension of the soul on account of the non-extension of those adjuncts. The individual souls are different from each other. Each soul is connected with a particular body, mind, etc.
The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone. Therefore the effects of works done by the soul in one body belongs to him in respect of that body only and not of any other body. All the individuals are not affected by the works done by a particular individual.
There will be no possibility for the Atman, as it is one, to experience all the pleasures and all the pains of all the bodies, because the bodies are disconnected.
Therefore there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.
Abhasa eva cha II.3.50 (266)
And (the individual soul is) only a reflection (of Paramatman or the Supreme Lord).
Abhasa: a reflection; Eva: only; Cha: and.
According to Vedanta, the individual soul is only a reflection of Brahman or the Supreme Soul in the mind like the reflection of the sun in the water. Just as the reflections of the sun in different pots of water are different, so also the reflections of the Supreme Soul in different minds are different. Just as, when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also, so also when a particular soul experiences fruits of his actions, viz., pleasure and pain, it is not shared by other souls. When the individual soul in one body is undergoing the effects of his actions, the soul in any other body is not affected on that account.
For those, such as the Sankhyas, the Vaiseshikas and the Naiyayikas on the contrary, who maintain that there are many souls and all of them all-pervading, it follows that there must be a confusion of actions and results, because each soul is present everywhere near to those causes which produce pleasure and pain.
According to the opinion of the Sankhya,s there exist many all-pervading selfs, whose nature is pure intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable excellence. For the common purpose of all of them there exists the Pradhana through which the souls obtain enjoyment and release.
In the Sankhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of Sankhyas is therefore an unfair conclusion.
Therefore there can be no confusion of the results of action.
Adrishtaniyamat II.3.51 (267)
There being no fixity about the unseen principle (there would result confusion of works and their effects for those who believe in many souls, each all-pervading).
Adrishtaniyamat: There being no fixity about the unseen principle. (Adrishta: the fate, the accumulated stock of previous actions, waiting as a latent force to bring forth fruits in future, merit or demerit acquired by the souls by thoughts, words and actions; Aniyamat: for want of any binding rule, on account of non-determinateness.)
The discussion begun in Sutra 50 is continued.
Sutras 51 to 53 refute the doctrine of the Sankhyas and other schools about the plurality of souls, each of which is all-pervading. It leads to absurdities.
This confusion cannot be avoided by bringing the Adrishta or unseen principle, because if all the souls equally are all-pervading, there cannot be any binding rule as to upon which of them the force will act.
According to the Sankhyas, the Adrishta does not inhere in the soul but in the Pradhana which is common to all souls. Hence there is nothing to fix that a particular Adrishta operates in a particular soul.
The doctrine of the other two schools is open to the same objection. According to the Nyaya and Vaiseshika schools, the unseen principle is created by the conjunction of the soul with the mind. Here also there is nothing to fix that a particular Adrishta belongs to a particular soul, as every soul is all-pervading and therefore equally connected with all minds.
Therefore the confusion of results is unavoidable.
Abhisandhyadishu api chaivam II.3.52 (268)
And this is also the case in resolutions, etc.
Abhisandhyadishu: in resolutions, etc.; Api: even; Cha: and; Evam: thus, like this, in the like manner.
The discussion begun in Sutra 50 is continued.
The same logical defect will apply also to the resolve to do actions. There will be no orderliness of resolves to do actions. That is want of order also in matters of personal determination, etc., if the individual soul be admitted to be all-pervading.
If it be held that the resolution which one makes to get something or to avoid something will allot the Adrishta to particular souls, even then there will be this confusion of results of actions, because resolutions are formed by the conjunction of the soul and the mind. Therefore the same argument applies here also.
If the individual soul is all-pervading, there cannot be any order in motives or matters of personal determination such as I will do a certain thing or I will not do a certain thing because in such a case, everyone becomes conscious of the determination of every other. Therefore no order of determination and its putting it into action can be maintained. Moreover collision between wills cannot be avoided. But order is found in this world everywhere.
Therefore it is established that the soul is not all-pervading.
Pradesaditi chenna antarbhavat II.3.53 (269)
If it be said (that the distinction of pleasure and pain etc., results) from (the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account of the self being in all bodies.
Pradesat: on account of particular locality or environment, from (difference of) place; Iti: thus; Chet: if; Na: not so, the argument cannot stand; Antarbhavat: on account of the self being in all bodies.
An objection to Sutra 52 is raised and refuted. This Sutra consists of two parts, viz., an objection and its reply. The objection portion is `Pradesaditi chet' and the reply portion is `Na antarbhavat.'
The Naiyayikas and others try to get over the difficulty shown in the previous Sutra by giving the following argument. Though each soul is all-pervading, yet, confusion of results of actions will not occur if we take its connection with the mind to take place in that part of it which is limited by its body.
Even this cannot stand. This also is not possible on account of its being within all. Because, as being equally infinite all selfs are within all bodies. Every soul is all-pervading and therefore permeates all bodies. There is nothing to fix that a particular body belongs to a particular soul.
Moreover, on account of the doctrine of limitation due to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain may effect their fruition by one and the same way, as it may happen that the unseen principle of two selfs occupies the same place.
Further, from the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would follow that no enjoyment of heaven can take place, because the Adrishta is effected in definite places such as, e.g., the body of a Brahmana and the enjoyment of heaven is bound to a definite different place.
There cannot be more than one all-pervading entity. If there were many all-pervading entities they would limit each other and therefore cease to be all-pervading or infinite.
Therefore there is only one Atman and not many. The Vedanta doctrine of one Atman is the only faultless doctrine. The only doctrine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the self. The plurality of selfs in Vedanta is only a product of Avidya, nescience or ignorance and not a reality.
Thus ends the Third Pada (Section 3) of the Second Adhyaya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedanta Philosophy.